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 Why Obey the Laws of Logic?1 
Robert J. Fogelin
A foolish consistency is the hobgoblin 
of little minds, adored by little 
statesman and philosophers and 
divines.  With consistency a great 
soul has simply nothing to do.
 Emerson, “Self Reliance”
Do I contradict myself?
Very well then I contradict myself
(I am large, I contain a multitude.)
 Whitman, “Song of Myself” 
The law of contradiction [tells us 
that] the true world cannot contradict 
itself, cannot change, cannot become, 
has no beginning and end.   
   This is the greatest error that has 
ever been committed. 
 Nietzsche, Will to Power2 
Man is a rational animal.
 Attributed to Aristotle
To the best of my knowledge (and to my surprise), Aristotle never actually 
says that man is a rational animal.  However, he all but says it.  Aristotle held 
that rationality is the feature that sets human beings apart from all other 
animals.  By this he did not mean that human beings always or even usually 
think and act in rational ways.  He knew better. Like other animals, human 
beings also possess desires and appetites, and these, if not properly managed 
by reason, can produce irrational beliefs and irrational ways of acting.  Yet, for 
Aristotle, a rational life is the ideal life, and to the extent that we approximate 
such a life, just to that extent do we realize our distinctively human essence.
Aristotle’s conception of rationality is complex and many-sided, but one 
of its central ideas is that thought, to be rational, must conform to the laws 
of logic. To take the primary instance of a violation of a law of logic, it is not 
rational to hold inconsistent or incompatible beliefs; for example, it is not ra-
tional to hold both that God is all-powerful and that God is not all-powerful. 
Doing so violates one of the fundamental principles of rationality: the law of 
contradiction or, as it is now more reasonably called, the law of noncontradiction. 
Traditionally, many philosophers (Aristotle among them) have considered 
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the law of noncontradiction to be the deepest, most fundamental, principle 
of rationality.  To abandon that principle is to abandon reason itself and thus, 
if Aristotle is right, to abandon the very feature that sets human beings apart 
from all other animals.
Yet, as the three quotations presented above show, not everyone has treated 
the law of noncontradiction with respect.  Both Emerson and Whitman refuse 
to be bound by it, and Nietzsche, in his usual over the top fashion, goes so far 
as to call it “the greatest error that has ever been committed.”  These three 
figures are not alone in rejecting the law of noncontradiction.  The voice of 
anti-rationalism can be found in fragments of some early Greek philosophers, 
and reappears two and a half millennia later in the writings of many contempo-
rary post modernists.  The status of the law of noncontradiction is the ultimate 
battleground on which the traditional forces of rationalism and anti-rationalism 
have met.  This conflict is the topic of this essay.
First of all what is the law of noncontradiction?  Stated accurately, if clum-
sily, it comes to this:
It is not the case that something is both the case and not the case.3 
Here some elementary notation will bring out the underlying structure of the 
law of noncontradiction.  If we let “~” mean “it is not the case that” and let “&” 
mean, as usual, “and,” then the law of noncontradiction has the following form:
~(p & ~p)
The claim is this: take any proposition you please, substitute it in both places 
for p, and you will always wind up with a proposition that is true.  For example, 
if we let p equal Lead is heavier than aluminum (which it is), we get the truth:
(1) It is not the case that (both) lead is heavier than aluminum and lead 
is   not heavier than aluminum.
This principle remains true even if we substitute something false for p, for 
example, if we let p equal Aluminum is heavier than lead (which it isn’t), we get:
(2) It is not the case that (both) aluminum is heavier than lead and
aluminum is not heavier than lead.
Since the truth of the proposition we substitute for p makes no difference to 
the truth of either (1) or (2), it should be clear that their truth does not de-
pend in any way on the actual weight of these two metals.  More generally, it 
doesn’t matter what we are talking about when we insert propositions into this 
pattern: the principle holds as well for daffodils, numbers, and furniture as it 
does for metals.  We thus have a principle that holds with perfect generality: 
The law of noncontradiction takes any proposition, whatever its subject matter, 
whether it is true or false, and generates from it a proposition that is always 
true.  Those who think that there are no certainties, wrong, for here we have 
a recipe for generating endlessly many certainties.
Explaining the law of noncontradiction this way may make it seem altogether 
trivial.  Someone might wonder what all the fuss is about since it is just obvious 
that every statement having the form of the law of noncontradiction will have 
to be true.  That’s absolutely right!  Noting this triviality, however, has the 
following important consequence: If you violate the law of noncontradiction 
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by asserting something of the form it is the case that p and also the case that not p 
you have said something trivially (obviously, boringly, stupidly) false.  Looked 
at this way, ultra-irrationalism turns out to be tedious. 
If this is correct, how do we explain the urge found among many historically 
important figures to reject the law of noncontradiction and find it of funda-
mental importance to do so?  The answer, I think, is that the status of the law 
of noncontradiction has been persistently misunderstood.  Instead of being 
seen as true, but trivial, it is taken as being profoundly significant, but false. 
The road to misunderstanding is paved by stating the law of noncontradiction 
in a more robust way, for example:
 A fact cannot both exist and not exist (or obtain and not obtain).
Or as Aristotle put it:
The same attribute cannot at the same time belong and not belong to the
 same subject in the same respect. 4 
Stated in these ways, with its reference to facts or attributes, the law of non-
contradiction seems to place constraints on the form that reality itself can take. 
Expressed this way, the law of noncontradiction seems to preclude certain 
possibilities and to do so in the strongest possible way.  This can suggest that 
the law of noncontradiction, far from being a triviality, is the most fundamen-
tal, the most encompassing, and the most constraining law of all.  The law of 
noncontradiction now appears to be a super law governing reality in its most 
fundamental aspects.  As Aristotle put it, this principle is true of “being qua 
being.”5  
This way of interpreting the law of noncontradiction is, I believe, altogether 
natural and also altogether mistaken.  It is the result of a deeply misleading 
picture that can naturally force itself on us—a picture of various laws operat-
ing at various levels of constraint.6   At the lowest level of constraint, so the 
story goes, there are human laws or human ordinances.  Being commands, 
these laws can be broken, though it is often considered wrong to do so, and 
you may be punished if caught.  Above these laws in degree of constraint are 
physical laws, e.g., the law of gravity.  Unlike human laws, these laws cannot 
be broken—except, perhaps, if God rescinds them in order to produce a mir-
acle.  But even if physical laws cannot be broken, they are still, as it is said, 
contingent laws.  The universe is in fact governed by certain physical laws, but 
it might have been governed by other physical laws or, perhaps, been governed 
by no physical laws at all.  It is this feature of contingency that supposedly sets 
physical laws below logical laws in stringency: Logical laws govern the world 
not contingently, but, as it is said, necessarily. 
Perhaps we can now see why people are sometimes inclined to reject the 
law of noncontradiction: They think that the law of noncontradiction is tied 
to the picture of laws just sketched, and they refuse to believe that the world 
conforms to this picture.  One reason, perhaps the chief reason, they reject the 
picture is that they hold that a world governed by the strict unchangeable laws 
of logic leaves no place for change (creativity, agency, action, progress, fun). 
For symbolic purposes, I will call those who adopt this position Heracleitians. 
4
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7  Heracleitians hold that radical change, not unalterable logical structure, is 
the fundamental characteristic of reality.  For Heracleitians, nothing is stable 
and unchanging.  Granted, certain things may seem stable, but, down deep, 
all is flux.  You cannot step into the same river twice—maybe not even once. 
Here, then, is a reason for rejecting the law of noncontradiction: the law of 
noncontradiction, it is thought, is incompatible with real change, but change 
is real—indeed, it represents the most fundamental aspect of reality.  If this 
is right, then the law of noncontradiction misrepresents the world in its most 
fundamental aspects.8   More than two thousand years later Nietzsche, who 
in various places praises Heracleitus,9  adopted the Heracleitean view of the 
world, tying it explicitly to a rejection of the law of noncontradiction.  This 
is the point of the passage cited at the head of this essay:
The law of contradiction [tells us that] the true world cannot contra-
dict itself, cannot change, cannot become, has no beginning and end.
Opposed to the Heracleiteans are those who accept this picture of the law of 
noncontradiction as a super law and then, reasoning in the reverse direction, 
conclude that change is impossible.  I will take Parmenides as the symbolic 
representative of this standpoint.10   The Parmenideans held that the real, or 
at least the really real, is rational and, for that reason, immutable.  This sup-
posed connection between rationality, reality and immutability is a persistent 
feature of western philosophy.  Calling something immutable is still a laudatory 
thing to say about it.  The Judeo-Christian God is said to be immutable.  (The 
Greek Gods were not immutable nor are the Hindu Gods—that is why they 
are more entertaining.)  Some still seek immutable truths as the grounds for 
ethics and forms of government.  Unlike the Rolling Stones (paradigmatic 
Heracleiteans), many people are made uncomfortable with the like of Ruby 
Tuesday who “changed with every new day.”  
It is, I think, possible to read the history of philosophy as a series of conflicts 
and accommodations between the Parmenidean vision and the Heracleitean 
vision.  At the moment, Heracleitus seems to be getting more press than Par-
menides—at least among advanced thinkers.  Historically, Parmenides has 
fared better.  Fashions change.    It is important, however, to see that, despite 
their deep differences, these primal opponents share a fundamental dogma:
If the law of noncontradiction is true, then change (real change) 
is not possible.
Anyone who accepts this conditional will be forced to choose between the 
law of noncontradiction and the reality of change.  Opting for the law of 
noncontradiction, the Parmenideans reject change.  Opting for change, the 
Heracleiteans reject the law of noncontradiction.  Notice, by the way, that 
both views share equally in the charm of being utterly outrageous.  Contrary to 
what Parmenides’ student Zeno says, Achilles can catch the tortoise.  Contrary 
to Heracleitus, you can step in the same river twice—three or four times, if 
you like.  Somehow, such plain facts get demoted to apparent facts, and then 
dismissed altogether.
My suggestion, then, is that the perennial dispute between the Heracleiteans 
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and the Parmenideans is driven by the shared view that the law of noncon-
tradiction is incompatible with change.  How are we to break the spell of this 
idea?  As noted, this cannot be done by citing plain facts.  Running will not 
move a Parmenidean; standing still will not stop a Heracleitean.  Instead it 
has to be shown that the analogy between physical laws and logical laws (as 
super-physical laws) is wholly misguided.  This will be our next topic.
*******
We can now go more deeply into the law of noncontradiction which, as 
we saw, correctly stated, has the following form:  
It is not the case that it is both the case that p and not the case that p.
Or, symbolically:
~(p & ~p)
This expression, as we saw, provides a pattern or schema for endlessly many 
propositions all of which turn out to be true for whatever proposition we sub-
stitute for the variable p.  Since, as we saw, the content of p can vary endlessly 
without affecting the truth of the resulting statement, it seems reasonable to 
suppose that the work of guaranteeing the truth of propositions that conform 
to this pattern must be done by the two words that do not vary, namely the 
words “and” and “not.”  But what do these words mean—what do they stand 
for?  Early in the twentieth century, Ludwig Wittgenstein had the remarkable 
idea that these words, though meaningful, do not stand for anything at all. 
They do not stand for anything in the world or in the mind or anywhere else. 
They are non-referring terms.
The idea that the meaning of a word is the thing that it stands for is so deeply 
ingrained that it strikes many people as simply obvious that a word that does 
not stand for or represent something must be a dead symbol—a mere mark on 
paper—hence meaningless.11   However deeply ingrained or natural this view 
might seem, Wittgenstein came to think that it was a prejudice—a prejudice 
that has been the source of endless confusion.  In effect, Wittgenstein arrived 
at this result by setting aside the question, “What do words like “and” and “not” 
stand for?” and asking a better question: “How do these terms contribute to 
the meaning of the total sentences in which they occur?” 
We can start with “not”—negation.  We can become utterly baffled if we ask 
what this word stands for.  Does it stand for nothing, nothingness, non-being?  If 
so, what sorts of things are they?  Does nothing really exist, and if it does exist, 
is it really nothing?  Questions of this kind can sound deep or silly depending 
on your philosophical mood or temperament.  The air clears at once if we set 
aside the question, what does this word stand for, and ask quite a different 
kind of question:
Starting with some proposition p, what happens if we construct its denial
using the word “not”?
The negation of a proposition can be constructed in a variety of ways, for ex-
ample, by putting the word “not” in the appropriate place in front of its main 
verb.  If you want to sound like a logician, you can put the expression “It is not 
the case” in front of the whole sentence.  There are other ways of negating a 
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sentence as well, but, however negation is achieved, we get the following result:
If a proposition is true, then the proposition that results from negating it 
is false, and if a proposition is false, then the proposition that results form 
negating it is true.
Wittgenstein captured this idea by introducing what came to be known as a 
truth-table definition of negation.  Using the symbol for negation introduced 
earlier, the truth-table definition looks like this:
p ~p
T   F     
F   T
It is important to see that nothing esoteric (or sly) is going on here.  The 
left-hand column indicates the two truth-values that a proposition can have: 
It can be true or it can be false.  The second column indicates what happens 
when a proposition is negated, i.e., when its truth-value is reversed.  Negation, 
we might say, is a truth-value flip-flopper.   Why should we have such a word 
in our language?  Well, among other things, it provides a convenient way of 
expressing denials.
If we now ask what gives negation the power to reverse truth-values in this 
way, Wittgenstein (in effect) says that the question is ill-conceived.  For him, 
the meaning of the word “not” consists in its capacity to reverse truth-values. 
This is its job—hence its meaning—in our language.12   It took the insight of 
a genius to see that the definition of negation should take this form, for this 
truth-table definition looks nothing like the definitions we commonly offer 
for nouns, verbs, and so on.  This difference in form reflects the special role 
that logical words play in our language.13 
Having given a truth-table definition of negation, we can turn next to 
conjunction.  A conjunction of two propositions is true just in case both of 
the conjoined propositions are true, false otherwise.  Thus, the truth-table 
definition of conjunction looks like this:
 p q p & q
 T T     T
 T F     F
 F T     F
 F F     F
Again, the novelty of this definition does not lie in the particular values we 
have assigned to conjunction in this truth table—that should seem trivial. 
(“Of course, a conjunction is false if at least one of its conjuncts is false; you 
don’t need a logician to tell you that.”) The importance lies in taking this truth 
table as a definition of conjunction.
Having given truth-table definitions of negation and conjunction, we are 
now in a position to look at the law of noncontradiction with new (let’s hope 
scale-free) eyes.  Specifically, we are now in a position to address the question, 
“What makes the law of noncontradiction true?” or “In virtue of what is it true?” 
The appropriate truth table for the law of noncontradiction looks like this:
7
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  A B      C             D
  p ~p  p & ~p        ~(p & ~p)
  T F         F             T  
  F T          F             T
Again, nothing esoteric is going on.  Moving through three stages, we have 
constructed a truth table for the law of noncontradiction. Column A gives 
the two possible truth values for p. In column B, we have constructed ~p by 
reversing truth-values of p.  In column C we have conjoined p and ~p.  Given 
the truth-table definition of conjunction, we know that this conjunction has 
to be false no matter what truth-value is assigned to p. (Thus, in column C, 
we have constructed the pattern for an explicit self-contradiction.)  In column 
D we have simply negated the formula in column C, thereby producing the 
pattern for the law of noncontradiction.  Given the truth table for negation, the 
result is that the truth-values under column C are reversed—where originally 
they were all false, they are now all true.
We now have something quite simple to say to the Heracleitean who finds 
nothing wrong in affirming an explicit contradiction.  As column C indicates, 
whatever the subject matter of his remark, he must be saying something false.  To 
think otherwise is to suffer from a curious form of linguistic amnesia concerning 
the meaning of the words “not” and “and.”14    But even if this embarrasses the 
Heracleitean, it gives little aid or comfort to the Parmenidean, for now the law 
of noncontradiction (represented in column D) emerges as a barren tautolo-
gy—a purely empty or formal truth.  To vary one of Wittgenstein’s examples, 
to be told that it is not the case that it is both raining and not raining is not 
to be told anything about the weather—or about anything else.
If this account is correct, then the picture of the law of noncontradiction as a 
super law of reality has been undermined.  The law of noncontradiction, rather 
than placing ultimate constraints on reality, places no constraints on reality at 
all.  Furthermore, we now see that the view shared by the Heracleiteans and the 
Parmenideans, that change is incompatible with the law of noncontradiction, rests on 
a misunderstanding.  The Heracleitean is wrong in thinking that we must deny 
the law of noncontradiction in order to affirm the existence of change.  The 
Parmenidean is wrong in thinking that we must deny the existence of change 
in order to preserve the law of noncontradiction.   They are both wrong and 
wrong for the same reason.  They share the view that change and the law of 
noncontradiction are incompatible when, in fact, the law of noncontradiction 
has no bearing on the possibility of change one way or the other.
*******
 It’s time to slow down, for it may now seem that we have managed to do 
something that Aristotle (in agreement with a great many other philosophers) 
thought could not be done, namely, we seem to have proved or demonstrated 
the truth of the law of noncontradiction.  Since the law of noncontradiction 
lies at the basis of all demonstration, it was not, Aristotle thought, capable 
of demonstration.15   I think that Aristotle is fundamentally right in this. 
Though truth-table definitions may help us understand the status of the law 
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of noncontradiction, they cannot be used to prove it.  The difficulty is this: 
In constructing these truth-table definitions, we seem to be taking the law 
of noncontradiction (or something very close to it) for granted.  To see the 
problem, we can look again at the truth table for negation:
p ~p
T   F     
F   T
But why not add a third possibility, namely that p might be both true and false:
p ~p
T   F     
F   T   
T-F     ?
It may seem obvious that this new third row does not represent a genuine pos-
sibility, but it seems that any attempt to establish this impossibility will itself 
rely on the law of noncontradiction, the very thing we are trying to prove.  So 
it seems that any attempt to prove the law of noncontradiction using truth-table 
definitions will presuppose the law of non-contradiction and, in that sense, be 
circular. This result may seem unsettling, for it may now seem that we have to 
accept the law of noncontradiction simply as a matter of faith.  If so, it is not 
clear how we are to deal with people (like Emerson, Whitman, Nietzsche, et 
al.) who place their faith elsewhere.
Here, however, Aristotle comes to our rescue.  Though he denied the possibility 
of giving a positive proof or demonstration of the law of noncontradiction, he 
suggested that the law of noncontradiction could be demonstrated “negative-
ly.”16   This negative mode of demonstration proceeds as follows: Confronted 
with someone who wishes to reject the law of noncontradiction, we simply 
wait for that person to either assert or deny something, and then ask whether 
it makes any difference whether we interpret the remark as an assertion or a 
denial.  If the person rejects the law of noncontradiction, it is hard to see why 
it should make a difference one way or the other. In effect, he is granting us 
the following permission:
“In interpreting what I say, you may add the phrase ‘It is not the case that’ 
to the front of any sentence I utter.  Do this as you please, for it will in no 
way alter the significance of my discourse.”
One who denies the law of noncontradiction might also announce the following 
hermeneutical principle that he uses in interpreting the utterances of others:
“In interpreting the discourse of others, I randomly put the phrase ‘It is not 
the case that’ at the front of sentences that I am interpreting.  Given the 
kind of interpretation I am engaged in, this in no way affects its significance.”
Has anyone ever accepted such mad principles of interpretation?  Well, some 
mystics sometimes seem to.  Some mystics seem to hold that the attributes 
of God so transcend human comprehension that it is a matter of indifference 
whether we apply humanly intelligible properties to him/her or not.  But even 
mystics usually have the good sense to restrict these views to the mystical—
which, they think, transcends all forms of discourse.  Most people, even those 
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who espouse extreme post-modern views, actually reject these wild principles 
of interpretation—at least, when not presenting papers at conferences.
I can illustrate this last point anecdotally.  I once found myself in a room of 
advanced thinkers where I was the sole person with a good word to say about 
the law of noncontradiction.  As a result, I was subjected to a great deal of 
ridicule and abuse.  I tried to explain to this audience—as I tried to explain 
above—that in rejecting the law of noncontradiction, they were, in all like-
lihood, not rejecting the law itself, but, instead, were rejecting a false picture 
that they mistakenly associated with it.  They would have none of this—hell-
bent on performing a slam-dunk against logo-phallic-western rationalism, 
they would accept no such temporizing compromise.  In exasperation I finally 
employed what is called an impolite or vulgar ad hominem.  I asked whether 
the organizers of the conference were applying for future funding from the 
National Endowment for the Humanities.  When someone indicated that 
they were, I asked whether it would make any difference whether the answer 
to their request was No rather than Yes, and, if so, why?  Not surprisingly, this 
produced a reaction of rage.
What is the point of all this?  After all, people do not actually adopt the 
wild principles of interpretation I have laid out, even if they sometimes speak 
in ways that suggest that they do.  If they don’t really adopt them, we want 
to know why not.  If we accept the law of noncontradiction, we then have 
straightforward reasons for rejecting these wild principles of interpretation. 
On the other hand, if we reject the law of noncontradiction—that is, really 
reject it, not just pretend to reject it—it is hard to think of any reason for 
not engaging in anything-goes interpretations in this perfectly mad way.  As 
Aristotle saw, this does not amount to a proof of the law of noncontradiction. 
It merely shows that people who reject the law of noncontradiction obliterate 
any significant difference between the speech acts of asserting and denying.  In 
denying the law of noncontradiction, they deprive themselves of the significant 
use of their own speech acts.  For this reason, on their own terms, they have 
no claim to be listened to.17  Sincere, they are self-silencers. This is Aristotle’s 
“negative demonstration” of the law of noncontradiction in somewhat modern 
guise.  None of this will move anyone who genuinely opts either for silence or 
for madness.  Since I opt for neither, I find Aristotle’s negative demonstration 
of the law of noncontradiction entirely persuasive.18 
Dartmouth College
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1  With a few stylistic changes, this is the text of a public lecture that I presented on 
December 4, 2001 at the Center for Philosophical Exchange at the State Universi-
ty of New York, College at Brockport.
 2   Friedrich Nietzsche, , #584
 3   The traditional Big Three of fundamental laws of logic is completed by two others:
 The Law of Identity.  (Everything is identical with itself.)
 The Law of Excluded Middle.  (Something is either the case or not the case.)
 Except for some asides, I will not consider these laws, but concentrate on the law 
of noncontradiction.     
 4   Aristotle, , IV, 3, 1005b19-20.
 5   , IV, 3, 1005a24-25. 
 6   The notion that a false or even nonsensical philosophical conception can force 
itself upon us through our tendency to adopt a faulty picture of how our language 
functions is a one of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s leading ideas.  Reflecting on mistakes 
found in his own earlier writings, he remarks:
   A picture held us captive.  And we could not get outside it, for it lay in our  
 language and language seemed to repeat it to us inexorably.  (Philosophical  
 Investigations, #115)
 In this essay I am trying to describe, or at least sketch, the picture that leads people 
to misunderstand the status of the law of noncontradiction.
 7    Heracleitus of Ephesus, an early Presocratic (c. 500 BC), is famous for employing 
the metaphor that the world is composed of fire.
 8   Some classical scholars deny that Heracleitus rejected the law of non-contradic-
tion.  But Aristotle thought that he did, as did other ancient commentators.  In 
any case, even if Heracleitus will not serve our symbolic purposes, his follower 
Cratylus, who outdid his master by saying that one cannot step in the same river 
even once, will.  According to Aristotle, Cratylus was so deeply committed to the 
doctrine of endless change or universal flux, that he thought it impossible to assert 
anything at all, holding, as he did, that the meanings of the words at the beginning 
of a sentence would change before the sentence was completed.  Cratylus, again 
according to Aristotle, was thus reduced to pointing his finger at things as they 
passed.  (See , IV, 5,1009a7-16.)
 9  For example, , , p. 480.
 10   Parmenides of Elea (c. 480 BC).
 11  There is, of course, something right about this claim that meaningful symbols are 
more than marks on paper or vibrations in air.  What is wrong is the assumption 
that all words get their meanings essentially in the same way that names seem to—
by referring to or standing for something.
 12   In equating the meaning of an expression with the job it performs, some may 
think that I am attributing a view to Wittgenstein’s early writings that is only 
found in his later writings.  This is wrong.  Wittgenstein’s initial break with a 
purely referential conception of language occurs first in the with respect to logical 
terms and numbers.  In his later writings, Wittgenstein expands this attack on the 
referential conception of language, with the result that much of the itself is reject-
ed root and branch.  I discuss these matters in Fogelin (1987) and Fogelin (1996).
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 13   Unfortunately, when writers of logic texts introduce truth-table definitions, they 
rarely comment on their deep philosophical significance.
 14  Willard Quine put it this way:  “[To] affirm a compound of the from ‘ and not is 
just to have mislearned one or both [of these] particles.  , p.23.
 15  , IV, 3,1006a5-11.
 16   , IV, 4, 1006a12-28.
 17   Not only will the contrast between asserting and denying be undercut, but 
a whole range of other speech acts will be compromised as well, for example, 
promising to do something as opposed to promising not to, asking someone to do 
something as opposed to asking him not to, and so on through a very wide range 
of different types of speech acts.
 18  I recently found a variation on Aristotle’s negative demonstration of the laws of 
logic in Daniel Dennett’s Darwin’s Dangerous Idea.  Confronted with a theolo-
gian who holds that “faith is quite beyond reason,” Dennett suggests the following 
rejoinder:
The philosopher Ronald de Sousa once memorably described philosophical theology 
as “intellectual tennis without a net” and I readily allow that I have indeed been 
assuming without comment or question ... that the net of rational judgment was 
up.  But we can lower it if you really want to.  It’s your serve.  Whatever you serve, 
suppose I return service rudely as follows:  “What you say implies that God is a 
ham sandwich wrapped in tinfoil.  That’s not much of a God to worship.”  If you 
then volley back, demanding to know how I can logically justify my claim that your 
serve has such a preposterous implication, I will reply:  “Oh, do you want the net 
up for returns, but not for your serves?  Either the net stays up or it stays down.  
If the net is down, then there are no rules and anybody can say anything, a mug’s 
game if there ever was one.  I have been giving you the benefit of the assumption 
that you would not waste your own time or mine by playing with the net down.”  
(Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, p.154)
 This doesn’t, of course, refute the theologian’s claim, for various responses are 
open to him.  There is the Zen move:  “Is God a ham sandwich wrapped in tinfoil? 
Yes.  We can say that too.”  And our fideistic theologian may take absolute delight 
in the thought that we have to play with the net up, whereas he doesn’t.  Such 
theologians and many so-called post-modern thinkers exist quite beyond the reach 
of intellectual embarrassment, except, that is, when their position carries with it 
personal disadvantages.  It is for this reason that I prefer the cruder version of an 
ad hominem attack of the kind given above.
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